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Abstract—Vehicular communication (VC) systems are being
developed primarily to enhance transportation safety and effi-
ciency. Vehicle-to-vehicle communication, in particular frequent
cooperative awareness messages or safety beacons, have been
considered over the past years as a main approach. Meanwhile,
the need to provide security and safeguard the users privacy
is well understood, and security architectures for VC systems
have been proposed. Although technical approaches to secure VC
have several commonalities and a consensus has formed, there
are critical questions that have remained largely unanswered:
Are the proposed security and privacy schemes practical? Can
the secured VC systems support the VC-enabled applications
as effectively as unsecured VC would? How should security be
designed so that its integration into a VC system has a limited
effect on the system performance? In this paper, we provide
answers to these questions, investigating the joint effect of a set
of system parameters and components. We consider the state-of-
the-art approach in secure VC, and we evaluate analytically and
through simulations interdependencies among components and
system characteristics. Overall, we identify key design choices to
deploy efficient and effective secure VC systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular communication (VC) systems will comprise ve-
hicles and fixed road-side equipment (RSU) with wireless
transceivers, sensing and processing units. Vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication will
enable a range of applications, with transportation safety
playing a predominant role. Practically all research and de-
velopment efforts converge to safety applications based on
V2V communication, with vehicles frequently beaconing their
status (e.g., position, speed, direction), along with warnings
about potential dangers.
Nonetheless, VC systems can be vulnerable to attacks and
jeopardize users’ privacy: An adversary could, for example,
inject beacons with false information, or collect vehicle mes-
sages to track their locations and infer sensitive user data.
Industry, academia, and authorities have recently understood
that security and privacy protection are prerequisites for the
deployment of VC systems. Security architectures were devel-
oped by the IEEE 1609.2 working group [1], the SeVeCom
project [2], [3], following earlier activities of the NoW project
[4] and now in parallel to the Car-to-Car Communication
Consortium (C2C-CC) [5] and the eSafety eSecurity working
group activities [6].
Across projects and working groups, secure VC systems rely
on public key cryptography and digital signatures to protect
V2V and V2I messages, facilitated by Certification Authorities
(CAs) that manage credentials for legitimate participants (vehi-
cles and RSUs). Pseudonymous authentication, with vehicles
utilizing short-lived credentials and public-private key pairs,
provides protection of privacy along with security (authenti-
cation, integrity and non-repudiation as primary requirements).
Security mechanisms protect all traffic sent across the 802.11p
data link [7], including the safety beacons each vehicle trans-
mits, typically every 100 to 300 ms.
Adding security for this high-rate communication will incur
high overhead, both in terms of communication and process-
ing. Consider, for example, a vehicle receiving digitally signed
safety beacons from a hundred vehicles within range; it would
need to validate a high percentage or practically all of those
within a short delay in the order of a hundred milliseconds [7].
Even if VC is effective under such dense network conditions,
the additional security overhead could cause failure in meeting
the delay and reliability requirements of safety applications.
This is especially so because the VC environment lacks
abundant resources (bandwidth, computational power).
The following question naturally follows: Can secure VC
systems be practical? Given the current system constraints and
design approaches, could the addition of security and privacy
mechanisms make VC systems ineffective? We address this
problem in this paper, building on our previous work [8], [9].
Based on broadly accepted approach for secure and privacy-
enhancing VC [1]–[4], we first outline how pseudonymous
authentication is possible without repeated interactions with
the CAs. Then, we present a proposal for reducing the security
overhead without harming the effectiveness of the VC system,
and we investigate how variants of secure VC instantiations
affect the system performance. In particular, we make the
following contributions: First, based on an evaluation of the
communication reliability, we determine if and how VC nodes
can sustain the incurred processing load, and we provide
an approximate analytical evaluation and closely matching
simulation results. Being able to determine if VC nodes have
sufficient processing power, we consider the overall system
performance with respect to transportation safety. We evaluate
how effective secure VC-enabled safety applications can be,
2under a broad range of system configurations. We identify
interdependencies between system and protocol parameters
and the safety application effectiveness. We find that appro-
priately designed security and privacy enhancing VC systems
can essentially support a safety application as effectively as
unsecured VC systems can.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss in detail the problem at
hand and outline our investigation approach (Sec. II). Then, we
present the set of representative secure and privacy-enhancing
VC schemes that we evaluate (Sec. III). The simulation
setup, our analysis and experimental results follow (Sec. IV-
Sec.VIII). We discuss the cost of revocation in Sec. IX. In Sec.
X we discuss related work and in Sec. XI we conclude with
a summary of our findings and a discussion of future work.
II. PROBLEM AND APPROACH OVERVIEW
We want to determine whether the broadly accepted state
of the art of secure VC is viable, especially considering
how challenging VC environments are; because heavy-traffic
scenarios (thus, dense network topologies) - with tens or
one hundred or more vehicles (nodes) within range - can
often occur. The traditional approach has been to analyze the
protocol overhead and the network performance. However, in
VC systems the objective is not to have a well-performing
network per se, but rather to effectively support VC-specific
applications. This is why we investigate the overall system
performance, considering five dimensions: (i) communication
technology, (ii) system resources, (iii) network configuration
and environmental factors, (iv) security protocols, and (v)
supported applications.
The communication technology is the IEEE 802.11p [10],
which is incorporated in the Dedicated Short Range Communi-
cation (DSRC) - Wireless Access in a Vehicular Environment
(WAVE) [11] and the Communication Access for Land Mo-
biles (CALM) [12] standards, and it is commonly accepted
for V2V and V2I communication. Vehicles transmit periodic
safety beacons on one dedicated channel, with the beaconing
rate being a system variable. Bandwidth, one of the primary
system resources, is determined by the standards, and it is
considered fixed for this investigation. The second primary
resource, processing power, can be adapted. Here, we take
into consideration platforms that are currently used in VC
prototypes, but any system should have sufficient processing
power for its designated tasks. Thus, the system designer
can always increase the processing power at the expense of
increased cost.
The use of specific cryptographic primitives and other
protocol functionalities determine the processing load for each
node (vehicle). We consider here the basic pseudonymous
authentication approach, which has gained broad acceptance:
It provides message authentication, integrity, non-repudiation
and it makes it hard for two or more messages from the
same sender to be linked1. Given the large number of tem-
1More precisely, it allows that messages produced by a node over a
protocol-selectable period of time, τ , be linked. But messages m1,m2
generated at times t1, t2 respectively, such that t2 > t1 + τ , should not
be linkable. The shorter τ is the fewer the linkable messages are and the
harder tracking a node becomes.
porary identities (pseudonyms) in the system, pseudonymous
authentication can become cumbersome to manage; therefore,
we consider here a novel scheme, first presented in [8], [9],
to alleviate this constraint, thanks to a more powerful but
also more expensive anonymous authentication primitive. We
describe these security protocols in Sec. III.
We consider safety applications, as they are a distinctive
feature of VC systems compared to other mobile computing
systems. Moreover, they are the most challenging among VC-
enabled applications; their stringent time constraints and their
critical nature can affect the well-being of the vehicle pas-
sengers. We focus here on one safety application, emergency
braking notification (EBN).
We provide a framework to analyze the effect of a given pro-
cessing load on the node performance, so that the appropriate
processing power can be determined and provisioned. Then,
we consider a system for which processing is not a bottleneck
(otherwise, the system would certainly fail) and we evaluate
the effectiveness of the EBN application. Conversely, given
such appropriate design choices (i.e., equipment with sufficient
power), our investigation reveals the effect of other parameters
and their interdependencies. We evaluate the performance of
the EBN application for a broad range of parameter combi-
nations along the above dimensions. Overall, we assess the
practicality of secure VC systems and identify guidelines for
appropriate design.
III. SECURE COMMUNICATION
Each node (vehicle) has a long-term, unique identity and
corresponding credentials managed by a Certification Author-
ity (CA); without loss of generality, we assume there is a single
CA, even though in reality a CA hierarchy would be present
[13]. Instead of utilizing their long-term credentials, vehicles
obtain from the CA and utilize a set of short-lived certified
public keys that do not identify the vehicle; then, they digitally
sign messages with the corresponding private keys. As this
is the widely used approach of pseudonymous authentication
[1]–[5], we refer to it as the Baseline Pseudonym (BP) scheme,
and define its operation in Sec. III-A. We consider only the
vehicles, as the privacy of RSUs or other infrastructure do not
need to be protected.
As the BP scheme requires that numerous short-lived certifi-
cates and keys are used by the vehicles, the stronger protection
of privacy the higher the number of identities would be. For
large-scale systems, this and the cost of periodically pre-
loading vehicles with temporary keys and credentials can
become a significant burden. To reduce key management
complexity and enhance the system usability and efficiency,
we propose a method that allows nodes to self-generate, in
other words to self-certify, their own pseudonyms. With this
approach, first described in [8], [9], vehicles do not need to be
side-lined or to compromise their user’s privacy if a “fresh”
pseudonym is no longer available; no “over-provisioning”
in the supply of pseudonyms is necessary; and the cost of
obtaining new pseudonyms over an “out-of-band” channel is
avoided.
This can be achieved with the use of anonymous au-
thentication primitives, notably Group Signatures (GS) we
3describe in Sec. III-B. As the practicality of GS in the VC
context is limited by their overhead, in terms of computation
and communication, we propose in Sec. III-C our Hybrid
(HP) scheme that allows vehicles to generate on-the-fly their
pseudonyms, by combining the BP and GS approaches. This
alleviates the management overhead of the BP; but in principle
it is more costly than BP. To reduce the cost of the HP scheme
to be roughly the same as that of BP and to increase the
robustness of any pseudonymous approach, we propose a set
of optimizations in Sec. III-D.
Concerning revocation, all the approaches make use of
Revocation Lists (RL), generated by the CA and distributed
to vehicles primarily via the infrastructure [2], [13]. When
a node validates a certificate, it checks whether the sender
is revoked; if successful (i.e. the sender is not revoked),
it proceeds with validating the other digital signatures. We
discuss further revocation-related functionality in Sec. XI.
A. Baseline Pseudonym (BP) Scheme
Each node V is equipped with a set of pseudonyms, which
are certified public keys without any information identifying
V . More specifically, for the i-th pseudonym KiV for node
V , the CA provides a certificate CertCA(KiV ), simply a CA
signature on the public key KiV (unlike the common notion of
certificate, for example the X.509 certificate). The node uses
the private key kiV for the pseudonym KiV to digitally sign
messages. To enable message validation, the pseudonym and
the certificate of the signer are attached in each message. With
σki
V
() denoting V ’s signature under its i-th pseudonym and m
the signed message payload, the message format is:
M1 : m,σki
V
(m),KiV , CertCA(K
i
V )
Upon receipt of M1, a node, with the public key of the CA
assumed available, validates CertCA(KiV ), and then verifies
the signature using KiV .
Each pseudonym is used at most for a period τ (referenced
in the rest of the paper as the pseudonym lifetime) and then
discarded. We abstract away a number of possible implemen-
tation aspects, such as (i) the dynamic adaptation of the period
of pseudonym usage, (ii) the number of pseudonyms (KiV
and the corresponding kiV , CertCA(KiV )) that are pre-loaded
to V , (iii) the the frequency of pseudonym refills, and (iv)
policies for pseudonym change, such as factors rendering a
pseudonym change unnecessary (e.g., a TCP connection to
an access point), and interactions of pseudonym changes with
the network stack [14]. All these are important yet largely
orthogonal to this investigation. The CA maintains a map from
the long-term identity of V to the {KiV } set of pseudonyms
provided to a node. If presented with a message M1, the CA
can perform the inverse mapping and identify the signer.
B. Group Signature (GS) Scheme
Each node V is equipped with a secret group signing
key gskV , with the group members comprising all vehicles
registered with the CA. A group public key GPKCA allows
for the validation (by any node) of any group signature ΣCA,V
generated by a group member. Intuitively, a group signature
scheme allows any node V to sign a message on behalf of
the group, without V ’s identity being revealed to the signature
verifier. Moreover, it is impossible to link any two signatures
of a legitimate group member. Note that no public key or
other credentials need to be attached to an anonymously
authenticated message; the format is:
M2 : m,ΣCA,V (m)
The concept of group signatures, introduced by Chaum [15],
is revisited in numerous works, e.g., [16]–[19], with formal
definitions in [20], [21]. For the rest of the discussion, we
assume and utilize the group signature scheme proposed in
[22]. If the identification of a signer is necessary, the CA can
perform an Open operation [20], [21] and reveal the signer’s
identity.
C. Hybrid Pseudonym (HP) Scheme
The combination of the BP and GS schemes is the basic
element of our proposal [8], [9]. Each node V is equipped with
a group signing key gskV and the group public key GPKCA
(recall that the group is the total of vehicles registered with
the CA). Rather than generating group signatures to protect
messages, a node generates its own set of pseudonyms {KiV }
(according to the BP public key cryptosystem). As for the
BP scheme (Sec. III-A), a pseudonym is a public key without
identification information, and {kiV } is the set of correspond-
ing private keys. For HP, the CA does not provide a certificate
on KiV ; instead, V uses gskV to generate a group signature
ΣCA,V () on each pseudonym KiV instead. In other words,
it generates and “self-certifies” KiV on-the-fly, by producing
ΣCA,V (K
i
V ). Similarly to M1, V attaches ΣCA,V (KiV ) to
each message, and signs with the corresponding kiV :
M3 : m,σki
V
(m),KiV ,ΣCA,V (K
i
V )
When a node receives a message M3, the group signature
ΣCA,V (K
i
V ) is verified, using GPKCA. If successful, the
receiver infers that a legitimate system (group) member gener-
ated pseudonym KiV . We emphasize that, as per the properties
of group signatures, the receiver/verifier of the certificate can-
not identify V and cannot link this certificate and pseudonym
to any prior pseudonym used by V . Once the legitimacy
of the pseudonym is established, the validation of σki
V
(m)
is identical to that for M1. To identify the message signer,
an Open on the ΣCA,V (KiV ) group signature is necessary;
message m is bound to KiV via σki
V
(m), and KiV is bound
to V via ΣCA,V (KiV ). Fig. 1(a) compares the BP and HP
approaches.
D. Optimizations for the BP and HP Schemes
We describe optimizations to reduce overhead (Optimiza-
tions 1 and 2) and enhance robustness (Optimization 3). We
employ the notation of the HP scheme, but the same consider-
ations hold for BP too. Figure 1(b) summarizes Optimizations
2 and 3.
4(a) Illustration of the BP and HP schemes. (b) Illustration of Optimizations 2 and 3, with α = 5 and β = 2.
One LONG message is sent every 5, and repeated 2 times after a
pseudonym renewal.
Fig. 1: Illustration of the BP and HP security schemes and related optimizations.
Optimization 1: At the sender side, ΣCA,V (KiV ) is
computed only once per KiV , because ΣCA,V (KiV ) remains
unchanged throughout the pseudonym lifetime τ . For the same
reason, on the verifier’s side the ΣCA,V (KiV ) is validated upon
the first reception and stored, even though the sender appends
it to multiple (all) messages. For all subsequent receptions,
if ΣCA,V (KiV ) has already been seen, the verifier skips its
validation. This optimization is useful because in practice
τ ≫ γ−1, where γ is defined as the beacon frequency.
Optimization 2: The sender appends its signature
σki
V
(m) to all messages, but it appends the corresponding
KiV ,ΣCA,V (K
i
V ) only once every α messages. We term such
messages (M1 and M3) as LONG. M4 is defined as follows:
M4 : m,σki
V
(m)
We denote M4 as SHORT, and α as the Certificate Period. α ∈
[1, τγ], where τγ is the total number of transmissions during
the pseudonym lifetime τ . To allow the user to choose the right
KiV to verify an incoming SHORT message, all messages will
carry a randomly generated 4-byte keyID field. This does not
affect privacy as all SHORT messages signed under the same
KiV can be trivially linked.
When a pseudonym change occurs, the new triplet
σki+1
V
(m),Ki+1V ,ΣCA,V (K
i+1
V ) must be computed and trans-
mitted. V will sign messages with the new ki+1V corresponding
to Ki+1V from then on.
Optimization 2 can affect the protocol robustness, if the
message that carries Ki+1V ,ΣCA,V (K
i+1
V ) is not received.
Then, nodes in range of V must wait for α messages for the
next pseudonym transmission, while being unable to validate
any message from V . This can be dangerous if vehicles are
close to each other and/or move at high relative speeds. Thus,
we propose the following scheme to mitigate this problem.
Optimization 3: V repeats the transmission of
Ki+1V ,ΣCA,V (K
i+1
V ) for β consecutive messages when K
i+1
V
Parameter Symbol Range Unit
Certificate Period α 1,5,10,15,30,50 messages
Push Period β 0 to 10 messages
Beacon Frequency γ 3.33 and 10 beacons/s
Pseudonym Lifetime τ 60 s
Number of Neighbors N 160, 240, 320 vehicles
Packet Payload m 200 bytes
Initial Vehicle Spacing s 20±1.5, 150, 200 m
Average Vehicle Speed v 65 and 80 Km/h
Road Setup - 4,6,8 lanes
Security Schemes - BP and HP -
Nominal Communication Range r 200 m
TABLE I: System parameters and values assigned for the
evaluation.
is issued, with β denoted as the Push Counter. After the β
repetitions, with β ∈ [0, α−1], the normal sequence 1 LONG,
α− 1 SHORT starts again.
IV. EVALUATION OVERVIEW
We analyze the system performance of secure VC along the
dimensions presented in Sec. II. Given the complexity of the
problem, we employ simulation as a primary tool of analysis
and we provide analytical approximations. We want to see the
effectiveness of the EBN application in a variety of setups,
each defined in the sections that follow, with the analysis
results in the relevant section. We analyze the system operation
to gain insight into the role of each of the system parameters;
indicative values for these are summarized in Table I. We study
challenging or extreme transportation conditions, because the
system has to remain operational, even under these conditions.
We assume that only vehicles transmit because RSUs will
always be less numerous (each serving an area with tens
or hundreds of vehicles), and often completely absent; thus,
almost all of the safety-related data will be generated by
vehicles. Finally, we also assume that all beacons carry
5Algorithm Security level Sign Verify Signature Public key Private key
(bits) (ms) (ms) (bytes) (bytes) (bytes)
ECDSA-192 96 0.5 3 48 25 24
ECDSA-256 128 0.8 4.2 64 33 32
GS 128 53.7 49.3 225 800 64
TABLE II: Computation costs on a 1.5GHz Centrino processor and communication overhead for different signing algorithms:
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) utilizing different standardized elliptic curves, and a representative efficient
Group Signature (GS) algorithm [22].
Sign (ms) Verify (ms) Overhead (bytes)
BP LONG 1.3 7.2 141
HP LONG 54.2 52.3 302
SHORT 0.5 3 52
TABLE III: Processing delay (in ms) and communication
overhead (in bytes) for different packet types.
Packets per beacon period γ−1
BP LONG 13.9
HP LONG 1.9
SHORT 33.3
TABLE IV: Maximum number of verifiable packets per γ−1
s, for γ = 10.
relevant information for safety applications. We couple the
ns-2 simulator, which simulates V2V communication, with a
custom module written in C, which simulates (i) the EBN
application and its effect on vehicles movement and (ii) the
security processing of messages. We choose such a combi-
nation because we could not find another publicly available
simulation environment with security functionality integrated
and with nodes adjusting their behavior according to the
messages they receive.
First, in Sec. V, we evaluate the cryptographic overhead,
in terms of communication and processing, and we choose a
representative choice of primitives, security level, and refer-
ence platform. Then, we analyze the communication reliability
in Sec. VI. Based on those two elements, we study the
effect of processing overhead on individual nodes in Sec. VII.
Finally, in Sec. VIII, assuming that nodes are provisioned
with sufficient processing power, we perform a system-wide
analysis for the considered EBN safety application and its
performance.
V. CRYPTOGRAPHIC OVERHEAD
We choose to use EC-DSA as the basic signature algorithm
[23], the group signature algorithm proposed by [22], and
security level of t = 96 bits for message signatures and
t = 128 bits for CA certificates in BP and for group signatures
used in GS and HP. High security might not be necessary for
the short-lived KiV , but it is required for the long-term keys
and CA certificates. Table II shows the costs for signature
generation and verification along with the overhead for the
chosen algorithms.
Overhead: The KiV , CertCA(KiV ) is 89 bytes for
BP, and with σki
V
(m) and KeyID the overhead is 141
bytes per message. For GS, the overhead is ΣCA,V (m),
thus 225 bytes per message. For HP, the overhead is
σki
V
(m),KiV ,ΣCA,V (K
i
V ), KeyID, in total 302 bytes per
message. For the α − 1 SHORT messages, the overhead
is σki
V
(m), KeyID, thus 52 bytes. The effective overhead
reduction depends on the value of α, as explained in Sec.
VI.
Computation: We make use of a Centrino machine
with the clock speed set at 1.5 GHz, which is close to the
CVIS (Cooperative Vehicle-Infrastructure System) vehicle PC,
a rather powerful platform (compared to generally available
embedded processors) adopted for the development of future
VANET applications [24]. We obtain an EC-DSA benchmark
on the platform through the OpenSSL standard test suite [25].
As for group signatures, a well-established implementation
of the chosen algorithm [22] is not yet available. Thus, to
estimate the processing delay, we calculate the number of 32-
bit word scalar multiplications required for GS signing and
verifying, extracting the relevant data from [26] and [27]; then,
we benchmark the scalar multiplication operation.
Table II shows the costs for signature, verification and
overhead for the chosen algorithms. To obtain individual
processing delays for a given type of message, it suffices
to take the sum of the corresponding cryptographic primitive
delays (M1, M3 and M4). As mentioned earlier, security levels
are t = 96 for σki
V
(m), and t = 128 for CertCA(KiV ),
ΣCA,V (m) and thus ΣCA,V (KiV ). We summarize the results
per message in Table III.
VI. COMMUNICATION RELIABILITY
The communication reliability is of central importance and
depends on the channel properties and load; the more loaded
the channel is, the more likely it is for a packet collision to
occur at the wireless medium, which depends on the number
of transmitters, N, the beacon frequency, γ, and the packet size
(including the security overhead). We implement beacons with
information on vehicle position, and on speed and direction,
with a timestamp, and safety warnings in a payload, m,
of 200 bytes. The physical layer transmissions are across a
realistic radio propagation model [28], [29], with a nominal
communication range of r = 200 m and a bandwidth of 6 Mb/s
[7], [30], [31].
We estimate, with the help of detailed simulations, the
average probability of successful reception at a receiving node
at the center of a 200-meter radius disc that covers the entire
width of a multi-lane highway and it is filled with N uniformly
spaced neighbors. We consider various settings, increasing the
number of lanes and decreasing the vehicle density, varying the
size of N from 8 to 160; a subset of these settings (four-, six-
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Fig. 2: Reliability of message reception for secure VC (beaconing), as a function of the neighborhood size, N .
and eight- lanes with average spacing of 20 meters) is used in
Sec. VIII. This metric is independent of the distance between
the transmitter and the receiver. The reception probability as
a function of the sender-receiver distance is presented in our
previous work [9], and it is omitted here for simplicity and
due to lack of space. The results are shown in Fig. 2 with
95% confidence intervals, and are repeated 5 times, with each
repetition lasting 60 s of simulated time.
We note that the 802.11p broadcast communication, a
CSMA/CA protocol without acknowledgements, could be
modeled and evaluated analytically, for example, in terms
of the probability of successful reception and throughput,
following numerous works for similar CSMA/CA protocols
under various assumptions (on traffic conditions, presence or
absence or channel errors, packet sizes, impact of hidden
terminals, etc). An effort to craft a precise analytical model
for VC is orthogonal to our investigation. What we need here
is an accurate evaluation of the communication reliability, as
a stepping stone for our security-related investigation; this can
be obtained via detailed simulations.
With the fixed available bandwidth, specific for the com-
munication technology, the communication reliability depends
on the offered load; Table V summarizes the load for each of
the scenarios in this paper. Fig. 2 shows the estimate of the
probability of reception, P (i.e. the ratio of received messages
over transmitted beacons), as a function of the number of
transmitters, N , the beacon frequency, γ, and the protocol
parameter α. We observe that the communication performance
degrades fast with N when γ is high (Fig. 2(a) for HP), while
the degradation is much slower as N increases for lower γ
values. The effect of increasing α, thus reducing overhead
is significant even when γ is not very high (e.g., γ = 3.33
beacons/s, Fig. 2(b) again for HP). Finally, as shown by
Fig. 2(c) for γ=10 and α=10, the BP and HP schemes perform
almost identically.
These results show that γ turns out to be the most significant
channel load factor. Choosing a smaller value for γ decreases
the channel saturation and thus the processing overhead (fewer
messages are sent); but it also affects the transportation safety,
as we show in Sec. VIII. At the same time, the appropriate
choice of BP and HP parameters can reduce security overhead
γ HP HP BP BP
(bcn./s.) α = 1 α = 10 α = 1 α = 10
10 5020 2770 3410 2609
3.33 1671.66 922.41 1135.53 868.70
2 1004 554 682 521.8
TABLE V: Offered load per transmitter, in bytes/s, for differ-
ent security schemes and settings.
(notably α, as it will become clear in Sec. VIII the needed
β values incur very limited overhead). The almost identical
P for BP and HP also show the benefit from the proposed
optimizations, as both schemes have comparable overhead
(with the advantages of HP).
VII. PROCESSING OVERHEAD
We want to answer the following questions: (i) How many
packets does a given node VR have to verify per time unit,
in various VC settings? (ii) What is the additional message
verification delay introduced by security? We consider one
beacon period, i.e. γ−1 seconds, as the time unit, as specified
by transportation safety requirements.
The BP and HP schemes use two general message types,
according to the induced security communication overhead:
SHORT messages carrying a node signature, and LONG
messages carrying a node signature and certificate. Each node
transmits one LONG message every α SHORT messages,
with β additional consecutive LONG messages sent upon a
pseudonym change.
The processing load at some node VR depends on the
number of packets it needs to verify. This consists primarily
of signature verifications for essentially all received beacons,
as they carry safety-related information. In a given slot, if VR
has N neighbors in range, it should validate O(N) messages
per time unit. Due to Optimization 1, VR needs to validate
the certificate signature only the first time it receives it from
each neighbor. In contrast, VR generates only one signature
per time unit, and for HP specifically it generates one group
signature per pseudonym lifetime.
N nodes Vi, i = 1, ..., N , produce messages at an aggregate
rate λ, and VR processes them at a rate µ. λ depends on
the number of neighbors, N , the message generation rate,
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γ, the type of generated messages, and the reliability of
communication across the wireless channel. µ depends on the
choice of security primitives (and their security level) and the
available on-board processing power. Thus, µ is constant for
a given system configuration.
We view the system operation as a queue: We are interested
in the system stability, which depends on λ, µ, and the queuing
model. To identify an appropriate model, we characterize the
arrival process and demonstrate that it can be closely approx-
imated by a Poisson process. Then, we provide an analytical
estimate for the average arrival rate, λ, and validate it through
simulations. Finally, we apply queuing theory results, in order
to answer the questions outlined above.
A. Characterization of the Arrival Process
We simulate the system and collect the message inter-arrival
times at some VR, for different setups of traffic conditions and
tuning of the security parameters α and β. Then, we fit known
distributions to the empirically obtained data and perform a
χ2 test to assess the quality of the fitting (p-value=0.05). We
find that the exponential distribution fits well the empirical
data; its memoryless property and the orderliness of packet
reception (any node receives one packet at a time and no two
or more arrivals occur simultaneously) suffice to approximate
arrivals as a Poisson process. Note that this is valid for the
type of traffic under consideration, i.e. safety beaconing, which
is going to be the majority of the traffic exchanged between
vehicles. If the type of traffic changes, then the arrival process
would in principle change.
We assume one processor at VR with deterministic service
times. We consider both LONG and SHORT packets in the
same single queue, with no priority policy and no preemption2.
The queue is then a multi-class M/D/1, in this case with two
classes. The average waiting time, Wi, is given by [32]:
Wi = ti +
∑r
j=1 λjt
2
j
2(1− ρ)
(1)
2We adopt this as a baseline approach, as we are interested mainly in
validating the general queuing theory approach. Obviously, several other
policies and system models can be employed.
where Wi, λi and ti are the total time in queue, the arrival
rate and the service time of the i-th (out of r=2) classes
respectively, ρ =
∑r
i=1 ρi and ρi = λiti. The queue length,
Li, can be derived from Eq. 1 and Little’s law [33].
B. Estimation of λ
An estimate for λ1, the arrival rate for SHORT messages
(derived in the Appendix) is:
λ1 = NP (1− (1− P )
K) (2)
with N the number of neighbors, P the average reception
probability for messages (beacons), and K = ⌊τγ/α⌋
2
. We
focus on SHORT packets because they are the majority of
the processing load as explained above and in [9]. From the
description of the BP and HP schemes (with Optimizations),
the simulations, and the derivation, it appears that LONG
messages have a limited impact.
In Fig. 3, we plot the analytical and simulation results, for
N ranging from 4 to 48 vehicles and γ = 10 or γ = 3.33
beacons/s; we average over 1000 randomly seeded simulations.
Fig. 3(a) shows how many packets VR must process as a
function of N, and that this relation is almost linear. As
Table IV shows, 333 signature verifications (SHORT packets)
per second is the maximum the node we consider here can
handle. This means that for λ1 ≥ 333 msg/s, considering
that incoming packets as SHORT, the node would be unable
to keep up and its queue of messages would grow fast. We
observe that for γ = 10, the value considered most often in
the literature, the arrival rate increases towards this threshold
while the message processing delay, W1 in Fig. 3(b), increases
fast with N .
Consider an example to illustrate this: with 80 transmitting
vehicles in range of VR, α = 10, β = 0, γ = 10, and τ =
60, and the resultant P = 0.655 (Fig. 2(a)). We assume a
highway scenario and a simple content-based optimization:
VR processes a beacon if it comes from a neighbor moving in
the same direction (stream of traffic). For simplicity, if the two
parts of the road are equally balanced, we consider N = 40
vehicles out of the 80 neighbors in range. From Eq. 2 we
8obtain λ1 = 264.3 msg/s and from the simulation of the same
scenario, the arrival rate would be 259.7 msg/s.
VIII. TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
We investigate how security affects transportation safety
in two settings. First, we consider pairs of vehicles, one
in a dangerous condition transmitting an EBN message and
another approaching vehicle that is previously unaware of the
transmitter and must receive the EBN message. We analyze
a fundamental metric, the ability to be early notified: We
capture this as the distance at which the receiver is first able to
validate the safety messages. The second setting we consider
is more involved: We study the occurrence of collisions among
vehicles in a platoon of one hundred vehicles, with and without
the use of security; the latter serves clearly as a benchmark.
We also investigate the impact of penetration rate of vehicular
communication rate, to gain insight on how security affects
the ability of the vehicular communication system to achieve
one of its fundamental goals.
We integrate here the results obtained in the previous
sections; we assume that vehicles have sufficient processing
power and are able to verify the signatures on all incoming
packets. We average over 1000 randomly seeded simulations
and present results with 95% confidence intervals. Recall that
Table I summarizes parameter values.
A. Simulation Setup
We consider four-, six- and eight-lane scenarios, with vehi-
cles placed in two opposing two-, three- and four-lane flows
of traffic, respectively. This corresponds to a neighborhood
N of 80, 120 and 160 vehicles respectively. Vehicles are 4-
meter long and they are initially uniformly randomly placed
along each lane, with an average vehicle-to-vehicle distance
of s meters. We focus on one lane of traffic within such a
neighborhood of N vehicles, which changes mildly because
of mobility. In the two-vehicle setting, there is a small initial
“gap” in one lane, depending on the initial spacing of the
pair of vehicles; e.g., when they are at 200 meters, there
are initially 10 vehicles less present, or in other words 70
(110 or 150) vehicles instead of 80 (120 or 160). The vehicle
velocities are initially random with an average v, unless stated
otherwise; velocities are adapted according the VC system
functionality and, in the platoon setting, upon visual contact
with the preceding vehicle’s braking lights. Vehicles do not
change lanes during the simulation, and they process messages
originating from vehicles in the same traffic flow (i.e., with the
same heading).
We consider an emergency braking (EBN) application, with
one vehicle in an emergency situation that brakes and starts
the transmission of EBN messages. Braking has two effects:
(i) it turns on the vehicle rear red lights that visually warn
drivers within range of sight (which depends on the simulated
weather conditions), and (ii) it triggers the transmission of
EBN warning messages. Besides warning other vehicles, an
EBN-warned vehicle warns its driver to start braking shortly
afterwards. We model driver reaction times as a result of
VC-enabled and visual warnings, with a random variable
uniformly distributed between 0.75 and 1.5 s. We model
weather conditions by setting vehicle braking capabilities and
visibility conditions; for example, on a wet road, braking is
possible at a rate of 4 m/s2 and a driver can see up to 30 m.
Our simulation conditions are in agreement with related work
in the transportation engineering area, e.g., [34], [35].
Two-Vehicle Setup: We consider one transmitter, Vt, and
one receiver, VR, at an initial distance of d meters, with VR
always behind Vt in the same lane and with a velocity for VR
higher than that of Vt. VR moves at a constant relative speed
∆v with respect to Vt, without any other vehicle in between.
For simplicity, we elect s to be such that it is less than or
equal to the nominal communication range at the beginning
of each simulation. We choose two setups, one with ∆v = 20
Km/h and s = 150 m, and the other with ∆v = 35 Km/h and
s = 200 m. We evaluate how the optimization parameters, α
and β, affect the distance, D, at which VR receives the first
KiVt ,ΣCA,V (K
i
V ) from Vt. In this setting, we wish to test the
ability of the secure VC system to deliver safety information,
especially under challenging conditions; e.g., VR is very close
to Vt when the latter changes to a new pseudonym (and private
key). Therefore, in order to evaluate the VC performance
alone, we do not consider the rear red lights of Vt; which,
of course, would naturally warn the driver of a VR in line of
sight.
Vehicle Platoon Setup: We focus on a platoon of one
hundred cars along a single lane moving with similar veloc-
ities, denoted as V1 to V100, with V1 for the vehicle at the
front and V100 at the rear of the platoon. We utilize values of
s = 20 m, velocities on the average v = 80 Km/h. We analyze
how many collisions occur when the leading vehicle V1 makes
an emergency brake and starts sending EBN messages. Once
some Vi, with i > 1 receives the warning, it starts sending
EBN messages itself. As proposed in [36]–[38], when Vi
receives a warning from a Vj with j > i, it stops transmitting
warnings, assuming that at least one vehicle behind Vi has
already been warned. In this setting, we consider rear red-light
warnings.
We choose pseudonym lifetime τ = 60 s. We consider the
first 60 s of the simulation time as a warm up period, during
which no emergency conditions arise. This approximates a
realistic situation: When an emergency arises, vehicles have
already validated (identified) some of their neighbors and
can thus immediately accept their warnings. The simulation
concludes when all vehicles in the platoon are immobile,
with V1 not resuming any motion after its emergency braking
action.
First, we consider scenarios where all vehicles are equipped
with VC systems. Intuitively, these full deployment settings
can lead to better safety thanks to the VC technology. But
they also correspond to more strenuous conditions, in terms
of processing and communication overhead. Nonetheless, VC
will be deployed gradually, over a period of several years.
Thus, we define the penetration rate, pr, as the fraction of
VC-enabled vehicles, and we analyze the system behavior as
a function of pr. Equipped vehicles behave as described above,
while non equipped vehicles rely only on visual means (the
red lights of the preceding vehicle) to detect emergencies. We
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Fig. 4: Distance D, at the time of reception of the first certificate at the trailing vehicle, VR, as a function the Certificate
Period α; without Optimization 3, varying the network size; HP scheme, γ=10 beacons/s.
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Fig. 5: Distance D, at the time of reception of the first certificate at the trailing vehicle, VR, as a function of the Certificate
Period, α; without Optimization 3, varying s and ∆v; HP scheme, γ = 10 beacons/s.
analyze this scenario with 4 lanes of traffic, α equal to 1 or
10, β to 0, γ to 10 or 3.33 beacons/s, and pr ranging from
0.05 to 1.
B. Two-Vehicle Simulation
In Fig. 4, the distance D at which VR receives the first
certificate ΣCA,V (KiV ) decreases as the Certificate Period α
increases: If a LONG message from Vt is missed, VR has
a chance to receive the next one only after α additional
beacons from Vt. Nonetheless, we observe that messages from
Vt can be validated in all cases before the distance becomes
dangerously small.
Impact of pseudonym change on safety: Missing a new
pseudonym could be dangerous if VR (and in general for any
vehicle) is close to Vt at the time of pseudonym change and
has high positive relative speeds (i.e., approaching fast Vt). To
capture such situations, we vary s between Vt and VR, with
results in Fig. 5(a): the curve generated by s = 10 m indicates
that VR is not able to validate Vt before reaching it (and thus
crashing in our simulation3). In another set of scenarios, we fix
s = 30 m, and we vary ∆v = 10, 20 and 50 Km/h (Fig. 5(b)):
The effect of α remains, but we also observe that with a higher
∆v, the drop in the reception distance with α is faster. Overall,
pseudonym switching can be risky if it happens when vehicles
are close to each other.
Optimization 3, not used so far, can address this problem.
Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b), for α = 10 and with β varying from
0 to 10, show that Optimization 3 is effective. Even a single
“pushed” message (β = 1) enables reception roughly within
2 meters after the pseudonym change, regardless of speed and
initial distance (clearly, the actual reception distance depends
on those parameters). Increasing redundancy, that is setting β
beyond 3, does not improve robustness any further. We observe
in Figs.6(a), 6(b) that an “optimal” is reached in most cases
for β = 1.
Intuitively, this is because the probability of receiving a
LONG message when VR and Vt are very close to each
other is relatively very high. If these two nodes are far, the
3In Fig. 5(a), the curve for s = 10 m converges eventually at s = 4
m: distances are computed from the front of the approaching vehicle to the
back of the preceding one. In this extreme scenario, the VC functionality for
an optimistic protocol configuration (e.g., α=30 or 50) results to collision;
which, of course, would have been averted by the visual contact and the
driver reaction that we purposefully omit from this setting.
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Fig. 6: Distance D, at the time of reception of the first certificate at the trailing vehicle, VR, as a function of β; HP scheme,
γ = 10 beacons/s.
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Fig. 7: Transportation safety with secure VC: Collisions, as a percentage of vehicles, in an emergency situation; varying road
conditions, message rates, protocol parameters, and VC technology penetration rate; HP scheme, γ = 10 beacons/s.
probability of successful reception is relatively low but there
will be several opportunities (subsequent transmissions) for
VR to receive a LONG message from Vt. To express this more
precisely, let Z be a discrete random variable for the slot in
which a LONG message is first received (during the lifetime
of the pseudonym). If E(Z) is the mean value, the average
distance from Vt that the first LONG is received by VR is
D = E(Z)γ−1∆v.
Vt transmits a LONG packets for β consecutive slots, and
every kα slots. The probability LONG is first received at some
j slot is simply the probability it is not received at any of the
i < j slots and it is received at the j-th, where i, j take values
from I = 1, 2, ..., β, β + 1, ..., β + 1 + α, ...:
Pj = P (j)
∏
k∈I
(1− P (k)) (3)
The probabilities at each slot, P (k), differ, as they depend
on the distance of the two nodes (and their neighborhood
more generally). Using values for different distances obtained
experimentally (Sec. VI and [9]), we compare Eq. 3 to the
simulation results, for s = 30 m, ∆v = 20 Km/h, α = 10,
8 lanes of traffic and γ−1 = 100 ms. Fig. 6(c) shows D
calculated with the help of Eq. 3 and the experimental data,
to clarify why low β values suffice.
C. Platoon Analysis
1) Fully deployed VC: Fig. 7(a) shows the percentage of
vehicles within a platoon of one hundred that crash as a
function of α. As a reference, we simulate the VC system
and EBN application without security. In the absence of V2V
communications, 80%-100% of vehicles crash; for the same
scenarios, safety messaging reduces the number of crashes to
approximately 10% of all vehicles. Then, overall, as expected,
security increases crashes compared to not secured VCs: the
increased network overhead and protocol restrictions on which
alert message can be validated delay the reception of valid
EBN messages4.
However, we observe that the tuning of the secure VC
protocols affects the safety application. We observe first a
decrease in the average fraction of crashes, as α increases, and
then a slow increase as α increases further. This is due to two
4For non-secured VC, the x-axis, the α, is not a parameter that affects its
operation. This is why the corresponding curve is essentially flat, with minor
variability due to the randomly seeded simulation scenarios.
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competing factors: the increase of α reduces the channel load
and thus increases the per-packet reception probability, but the
authentication delay for a receiver missing a LONG packet also
increases; e.g., for α = 50, the authentication delay is (at least)
5 s. We note also that the use of Optimization 3 reduces the
number of crashes with respect to the non optimized protocol,
with the same value for α, as it adds negligible overhead
but manages to reduce the authentication delay, as explained
above.
2) Effect of VC penetration rate on safety: First, we observe
in Fig. 7(b) that the crash average decreases when pr increases,
as expected. Then, we observe that γ is dominant; the curves
for α = 1 and α = 10 almost overlap for a given value
of γ. We also observe that the group of curves with different
values of γ are well separated, with a higher number of crashes
for γ = 3.33. This beacon frequency is not sufficient, in our
scenario to warn the drivers, although the channel reliability is
higher (as shown in Fig. 2(a)). Vehicles send many (one third)
messages less compared with the case γ = 10.
Fig. 7(c) shows what happens in a less challenging scenario,
with average inter-vehicle spacing of 40 m, vehicle speed of
65 Km/h, braking capability of 6 m/s2 and visual range of
70 m (modeling dry road conditions and good weather). First,
we observe a much lower percentage of crashes, now ranging
between 25-30% and no crashes; the separation between the
curves for different γ values is also smaller, even though a
higher percentage of crashes is observed for the low γ = 3.33
beacons/s. Tuning α affects the number of crashes when pr is
in the range of 40-80 %; for α = 10 we observe an increase
variable from 15 to 40 % compared to the case with α = 1.
Conversely, if VC has relatively low (pr < 0.4) or high (pr >
0.8) penetration, security optimizations have a limited impact.
IX. REVOCATION
We discuss here the revocation costs, based on the use of
Revocation Lists (RLs). We note that this is a largely orthog-
onal problem to this investigation and out of the scope of this
paper; moreover, there are several unknown parameters and
factors in terms of the instantiation of a revocation solution.
Nonetheless, in order to provide a complete picture, we con-
sider the revocation overhead for each of the security schemes
considered. We did not consider revocation in Sec. VII, but it
is straightforward to do so. It suffices to add the revocation
processing delay to that for validating LONG messages (in
fact, the first-received LONG per node and pseudonym lifetime
for BP and HP).
The basic difference between BP and HP (and GS) schemes
is that the former deals with short term keys while the latter
with long-term ones. The number of vehicles that would be
revoked is not currently known and it is hard to estimate,
because it would depend on policy decisions, the size of
the system in each region, among other currently unknown
aspects. Here we denote the number of revoked vehicles as R.
Then, for the HP (and GS) scheme, the size of the revocation
list would be |RLHP | = R. While, for BP , |RLBP | = c×R,
where c is essentially the number of temporary keys each
vehicle holds at the time of its revocation.
c can be a large number, in the order of 104 to 106; but,
again, its actual value depends on factors out of the scope
of this paper. For example, the ability of vehicles to have
frequent access to a trusted third party to obtain their short-
term certificates, or the autonomy of vehicle policies mandate.
Approximately, we can consider that c corresponds to the
number of pseudonyms a vehicle obtains at a “pseudonym
refill”, and we can assume that pseudonyms are valid only
between two consecutive refills. Then, a revoked node running
BP would be unable to obtain a new set of pseudonyms [14],
and RLBP would include only the pseudonyms granted at the
last refill. Consider an example for c: with τ=60 s, in one day a
vehicle V would “consume” 1440 pseudonyms. Assuming that
pseudonym refills take place once per month, then c = 43200;
if the refill were made once per year, then c = 518400. In
the rest of the discussion, to provide illustrative examples, we
assume that on the average c ≈ 104.
The cost to verify whether a pseudonym is revoked is the
cost of a lookup into the RL. This can be achieved in constant
time, e.g. by using a hash table. In this case, the construction
of the data structure is proportional to |RLBP |, and it must be
performed every time a new RLBP is received. The required
memory is also ≈ |RLBP | × EBP bytes, where EBP is the
size of one entry in the hash table. EBP is composed by a
serial number and a revocation date and it sums to EBP=
14 bytes [1]. Thus, for each revoked vehicle (i.e. long-term
identity) holding c pseudonyms, at least 140 KB would be
needed.
For GS and HP schemes, we extract relevant data from [22],
[27]. Each entry in RLHP is a revocation token of 32 bytes
(Note: for simplicity, we use interchangeably the subscript GS
for HP in terms of revocation.). Then, we consider two related
revocation methods proposed in [22]: the first one, we term
GS-I, incurs a processing cost that is proportional to the size
of the RL; the second one, GS-II, has a fixed cost independent
of the RL size, but it might allow the linking of some Group
Signatures [22].
GS-I: The revocation tokens, each EGS=32 bytes, are used
directly for the revocation check process. The cost to verify
one entry is Cp×|RLGS|, where Cp is the cost of computing
one bilinear map. Group signatures of not-revoked nodes
cannot be linked under any circumstances, but checking if a
singer is revoked requires a traversal of the entire RLHP (in
other words, it is linear in the number of revoked vehicles).
GS-II: The basic difference from GS-I is the calculation of
the Group Signatures, which include some intended recipient,
S, a random positive integer r, now chosen by the signer to
have a value less than a security parameter k. As it will be
explained in further detail below, this construction allows S to
pre-compute k revocation values and check revocation status
of the signer through a simple look-up; if, however, k were
low, the signer might be forced to re-use r values, in which
case these group signatures from the same signer could be
linked.
Since the safety beacons are broadcasted, we need to adapt
the scheme to the VC context: We redefine S to be S =<
G, T >, where G indicates a geographical area and T a time
interval. Essentially, in a given area and time, every recipient
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BP GS-I GS-II
RL size 144R KB 32R B 32R B
Revocation check cost 1 µs. 15R ms. 30 ms.
Hash table construction 0.1R s. - 1.5R s.
Memory requirements 140R KB - 38.4R KB
TABLE VI: Indicative values for revocation check costs as a
function of R, for Cp = 15 ms, k=100, τ=60 s.
can perform the fast revocation status check. For practical
reasons, G and T can be coarsely defined, so that receiving
nodes can easily determine the appropriate values (e.g., with
the help of their on-board clock, GPS receiver, or other
localization means with the help of terrestrial infrastructure).
Upon reception of a new RLGS , a verifier VR in S pre-
computes and stores the k revocation values for each entry
in the RLGS , at a cost of 2Cp per entry. The cost to build
this data structure is then 2Cp × R × k. Upon receipt of a
ΣCA,V (K
i
V ), the verifier VR performs a lookup into the table
and if no match is not found (i.e. the signer is not revoked)
it validates the signature. The cost to verify if the sender
is revoked is 2Cp, plus the lookup cost which is negligi-
ble compared to Cp. The memory needed is approximately
|RLGS| × k × EGS bytes. EGS in this case is the result of
one pairing computed from the revocation token, and its size
is 384 bytes.
For a given S =< G, T >, the value of k should be chosen
such that a single sender is not forced to use the same r twice
or more. Basically, it should be k ≥ ⌈|T |/τ⌉. However, high k
would increase the pre-computation costs, which also depends
on how the RLGS changes over time. Investigating trade-offs
due to chosen values, e.g., τ , |T |, is left as future work. In
order to provide a numeric example, we fix k=100, which
corresponds to |T |=1h 40min, and we summarize the results
in Table VI, assuming Cp = 15ms, k=100, τ=60s, and the
basic operations on the hash table, such as memory copy and
data lookup, to be 1 µs.
Clearly, the BP scheme incurs the minimum computational
overhead but it has by far the longest RL. Moreover, the GS-
I method could be cumbersome to apply, especially for the
platform we considered here and for sizeable RLs. Then, the
cost of GS-II is independent of R but it remains higher than
that of BP. Nonetheless, the advantage of GS-I and GS-II is
the much smaller size of RLs, and the lower memory and
bandwidth their storage and transmission require.
Finally, recall that for the GS scheme, the revocation status
check must be performed for each message; while for the HP
scheme, the check is needed only once per previously unseen
pseudonym. It is also important to note that the revocation of
a node implies its anonymity is lost; then, any entity that has a
transcript of its past transmissions in a given area, can use the
corresponding revocation token and identify which messages
in the transcript were sent by the revoked node.
X. RELATED WORK
The use of pseudonyms was first envisioned in [39] and
more recent works considered their use in the context of VCs,
e.g., [14], [40], [41]. More generally, several recent works
are concerned with different aspects of security and privacy
of vehicular networks, either outlining challenges [42], [43],
describing particular attacks [44], [45] or more general attack
overviews [46], [47], proposing mechanisms [48], [41], [49],
[1], [50] that combines public and symmetric key cryptography
to authenticate messages and is complementary to our work,
and schemes for revocation [2], [13], [51].
The idea of pseudonym self-generation for ubiquitous com-
puting is proposed, independently of our work, in [52]. More
recently, [53] applied that crypto-system to VANET. These
works do not consider all the system-level issues we consider
in this work, such as certificate distribution and application
robustness. Our findings and mechanisms also apply to their
work, complementing and extending it.
An alternate approach to reduce packet overhead and com-
putation efforts is presented in [54], which proposes that a
signer attaches its certificate to messages only when it detects
a change in its neighborhood, with such changes detected
from beacons. In dense topology settings, the results of [54],
although obtained in less realistic conditions, are comparable
to ours.
A couple of recent works propose to use bilinear pairings
to provide privacy in VANET. The approach of [55] is similar
to our GS scheme, thus it would be cumbersome if not
impossible to apply for safety beaconing. [56] employs a mix
of traditional public-key cryptography and bilinear pairings;
this bears some resemblance to our HP scheme, but it is mainly
limited by its strong reliance on the presence of RSUs; they
are not envisioned to be densely present in most, if not all,
deployment scenarios.
A few other papers [30], [36]–[38] proposed algorithms
to provide transportation safety based on VC and analyzed
their effectiveness. Transportation engineers also studied the
problem of reducing collision chains in a platoon of cars
[34], [35]. But the combined study of transportation safety
applications enabled by VC and the effect of security overhead
has not been considered.
XI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We analyzed the effect of security, in particular pseudony-
mous authentication that has been broadly accepted, on the
VC system effectiveness and notably a safety application with
stringent reliability and delay requirements. We considered
several dimensions of the system operation; we provided a
framework to analyze the performance of secure VC systems,
along with schemes that reduce the complexity and the over-
head of security; and we identified the interdependencies of
various factors and system limitations.
We found that indeed the communication reliability is
significantly affected by the security overhead in challenging
yet likely to occur in reality situations (e.g. densely packed
vehicles in multi-lane highways). Then, we characterized
the arrival process for the incoming traffic for the security
and networking protocols in questions, and we determined
the processing load at each node. We derived an analytical
approximation and a rule-of-thumb method to determine if
nodes and thus the system can be stable in its operation for
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a given security functionality. As a result, the appropriate on-
board processing power (and memory resources, even though
this is a lesser challenge) can be easily determined and thus
provisioned.
Assuming that sufficient on-board processing power and
resources are indeed available, we analyzed the effectiveness
of the secure VC system in challenging communication en-
vironments. Given the unreliable communication, especially
among remote but nominally in-range nodes, we found that
our schemes reduce security overhead and increase the system
effectiveness. In fact, reduction of overhead, which is welcome
in all cases, is more effective in highly loaded scenarios,
while only limited targeted redundancy (when pseudonyms
change) can remedy the communication unreliability. Overall,
the tuning of the security and privacy enhancing protocols is
very simple yet effective. We considered numerous parameters,
including road conditions, drivers’ reactions, as well as a sim-
ple two-vehicle setting but also a one-hundred-car platoon in a
multi-lane high-way, and also the VC equipment penetration
rate. This comprehensive evaluation is the first of its kind,
and shows that secure VC systems, as currently envisioned
in the research community, can be practical, that is, support
demanding and critical applications as effectively as unsecured
ones.
We strongly believe that systematic evaluation of the overall
performance is critical, especially for pervasive computing
systems that are tightly coupled to their users. Exactly because
security and privacy are paramount for those systems, yet
they incur significant overhead, designs should be validated, to
show that the secured systems can be effective as envisioned
and needed. This is what we do for a system as complex as
vehicular communications; this being the first work taking this
approach, we aspire to produce and see further results for a
technology that can be very widely deployed in the near future.
Additional characteristics of the transportation environment,
and completely different scenarios are to be considered as
part of future work. For example, urban settings, with traffic
lights, change of routes in case of congestion or emergency, as
well as alternative safety applications, such as an emergency
vehicle propagating a right-of-way message or corner-collision
avoidance, are interesting features for our future investigations.
The role and the presence of infrastructure could be debatable;
or, more complex VC-enabled applications which are cur-
rently still under development could be analyzed. Moreover,
alternative communication technologies can be part of future
work, posing differing constraints and limitations in terms of
communication performance (e.g., reliability as a function of
the networking environment).
Alternative security and privacy enhancing mechanisms
is another future work direction. For example, alternative
cryptographic primitives or additional cryptographic protocol
functionality are to be investigated. In this paper, we chose to
work on the widely accepted solutions, including those that are
currently moving on towards standardization. As alternative
solutions can emerge, each of them must be evaluated in terms
of its practicality, notably to achieve the supported system’s
(application) objectives. The framework we present here offers
a straightforward approach to investigate in detail such new
schemes. Then, for any scenario we can identify the processing
power needed to enable a given design for revocation, and
proceed with the overall system (application) performance
evaluation.
APPENDIX
We derive here the approximation for λ1, the average arrival
rate for SHORT messages, i.e. Eq. 2 in Sec. VII. We consider
a set of N transmitters Vi and one receiver VR, all running
the protocol with the same configuration (i.e. all Vi use the
same beacon interval γ, the same pseudonym lifetime τ ,
and the same Certificate Period α, and β = 0 as a minor
simplification due to the low effect of β on overhead for
the values recommended by the findings in Sec. VIII). As
discussed in Sec. VIII and Sec. VI, each message is received
with a different probability depending not only on the overall
setup but also the (fast changing) distance between sender and
receiver; obtaining these values is far from trivial.
Here, we make a few simplifying assumptions: We consider
some slot, t, and assume that all N transmitters send a
beacon, SHORT or LONG during that slot. Recall that each
LONG entails a calculation equivalent to a SHORT (due to
the verification of the ECDSA signature), plus an additional
overhead when VR receives a LONG with a new pseudonym
(due to the GS verification). We assume that each beacon
is received with probability P , independently from all other
N−1 beacons. (The probability of reception is for example the
average of the probabilities of reception at different distances
for the given neighborhood, obtained from Sec. VI).
For some sending node Vi, its message will be verified
by VR with probability p × Prob{Vi’s LONG was already
received}. This is determined by how many times the given
Vi transmitted a LONG message (as we assume that the
reception of LONG packets is also with probability P ). By
the definition of the scheme (HP or BP), during τ seconds, a
pseudonym lifetime, Vi transmits ⌊τγ/α⌋ LONG packets.
The number of these LONG packets from Vi that VR
observed (i.e. could potentially receive, e.g., being in range)
depends on various factors beyond this model (e.g., mobility,
individual vehicle trajectories, road shape, communication
obstructions). Here we make one more final simplifying as-
sumption: Each Vi is on the average “half way through” its
current τ , thus, it has on the average transmitted K = ⌊τγ/α⌋
2
LONG packets.
Then, the Prob{Vi’s LONG was already received} is es-
sentially the Prob{Vi’s LONG was received at least in one of
K tries}; this is equal to 1 − Prob{Vi’s LONG was received
in none of K tries} = 1 − (1 − P )K . As all of the N nodes
sent out a packet, in each slot, on average VR will receive
λ1 = NP (1− (1− P )
K) (4)
to process. This completes the derivation of the approximation
of Eq. 2.
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